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Abstract
Prices for the same flight change substantially depending on the time of purchase.
Labeling this time-variation as discriminatory is misleading because the cost of an
unsold airline seat changes with inventory, days before departure and aggregate demand
expectations. This paper uses a unique dataset with round-the-clock posted fares to
identify a dynamic price discrimination component. Consistent with agents forming
expectations of future prices, we find higher prices during office hours (when business
travelers are likely to buy tickets) and lower prices in the evening (when leisure travelers
are more likely to purchase). As the proportion of business travelers increases closer
to departure, both price dispersion and price discrimination become larger. We also
find that price discrimination is more pronounced for low cost carriers than for legacy
carriers.
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1 Introduction
The U.S. commercial aviation sector plays a large role in the U.S. economy, comprising
4.9 percent of U.S. GDP in 2010 (International Air Transportation Association). There
were 812.9 million domestic and international enplanements in 2012 (Bureau of Transporta-
tion Statistics) with the fifteen largest U.S. carriers collecting $159.5 billion in revenue in
2012. Yet, these U.S. carriers registered small profit margins of just 3.7 percent (Bureau of
Transportation Statistics). Given that the composition of customers that are shopping for
airline tickets changes during the day, the objective of this paper is to determine whether
airlines are systematically charging different prices throughout the day to increase revenue.
Dynamic price discrimination occurs when a company sells an identical good at different
prices based on the time of purchase.
Dynamic price discrimination exists in a large number of industries (e.g., fashion ap-
parel, car rentals, retail sales, hotels, e-commerce). It is well known that airlines offer
substantially different fares for the same flight. Airlines use different ‘fences’ (e.g., refund-
ability, cabin, Saturday-night-stayover, frequent-flier programs, or advance purchases) to
implement multiple screening mechanisms and separate among unobserved consumer types
into different groups. This has led to a surge in the literature studying airline’s price disper-
sion (see, e.g., Borenstein and Rose, 1994; Gerardi and Shapiro, 2009; Gaggero and Piga,
2011; and Dai et al., 2014). Labeling the observed price dispersion as price discrimination,
however, is a challenging task because existing price differentials are also due to differences
in quality and costs. For example, a refundable ticket is a higher quality product than a
non-refundable ticket and the cost of an airline seat at different days to departure depends
on seat availability and demand expectations.1 Hence, the well-known time-variation in
airline prices is not necessarily price discriminatory.
In this paper we exploit a unique panel of flights that keeps round-the-clock track of the
dynamics of posted prices for two months prior to departure. We document statistically
and economically significant price dispersion that occurs for the same flight and within
the same day-to-departure. In addition, within this price dispersion we identify a dynamic
1At a given day to departure and for a given inventory of seats the opportunity cost of a seat is higher
if demand is expected to be larger (see, e.g., Escobari, 2012).
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price discrimination component. On price dispersion within the same day the results show
that fares peak at 3:00 a.m. when sellers typically revise prices upwards and they are the
least expensive at 9:00 p.m. The estimated price difference between these two hours is on
average 0.65% ($2.44) during the two months prior to departure and is about 1.28% ($5.34)
for the last two weeks to departure.
Controlling for quality, costs and multiple screening mechanisms we are able to identify a
dynamic price discrimination component that arises when airlines set higher prices during
office hours and lower prices later in the evening. At seven days to departure fares are
0.25% ($1.04) more expensive during office hours.2 We argue that airlines know that
some consumers are more likely to be active at different times of the day and use this as
a screening mechanism to separate consumers into types that are heterogeneous in their
valuations. Higher valuation consumers (business travelers) are more likely to buy during
office hours, while lower valuation consumers (leisure travelers) are more likely to buy later
in the evening. Our results also support a higher dynamic price discrimination as the
departure date nears and the proportion of business travelers increases. Because the airline
pricing problem is dynamic in nature, we estimate a dynamic model that is consistent with
rational expectations and with agents forming expectations about future prices.
There is extensive theoretical literature on discounts and price discrimination. Nevo
and Hendel (2013) present an intertemporal price discrimination model for storable goods,
while Chevalier and Kashyap (2011) examine price discrimination in a durable goods set-
ting. Stokey (1979) looks at price discrimination for new products. Theoretical models
that are closer to airline pricing include Dana (1998) who explains the existence of price
discrimination in the form of advance-purchase discounts when demand is uncertain, and
Courty and Li (2000) who consider sequential price discrimination where a monopolist
screens consumers using refund contracts.
On the empirical side, Shepard (1991) finds price gaps in gas stations that are consis-
tent with price discrimination. Verboven (1996) looks at price discrimination as a plausible
explanation behind price differences in automobiles across European countries and Leslie
2While $1.04 is a relatively small amount, given the 813 million U.S. passenger enplanements in 2012
(Bureau of Transportation Statistics), slightly higher fares during office hours can generate millions of dollars
in higher airline revenue.
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(2004) studies price discrimination for Broadway play tickets. More recently in the airline
industry, Berry and Jia (2010) estimate the proportion of business and leisure travelers,
while Escobari and Jindapon (2014) show theoretically and empirically how price discrim-
ination through refundable tickets decline as individuals learn about their demand. Puller
and Taylor (2012) under strong assumptions look at discrimination based on the day-of-
the-week purchase and Siegert and Ulbricht (2014) explore how price dynamics vary with
the competitive environment.
This paper also contributes to the airline price dispersion literature by shedding light on
price dynamics for perishable goods under demand uncertainty. Most prior work on airline
price dispersion has been empirical. Borenstein and Rose (1994), Gerardi and Shapiro
(2009), and Dai et al. (2014) estimate the effect of competition, Bilotkach et al. (2010)
study airlines’ pricing strategies, Bilotkach and Rupp (2012) analyze the price-offer curves,
and Alderighi et al. (2015) study the effects of booking time and load factors on fares.
Recent theoretical studies on airline price dispersion include Czerny and Zhang (2015),
who develop a framework to examine third-degree price discrimination by a monopolist at
a congested airport, and Czerny and Zhang (2014), who consider airport congestion pricing
when carriers can price discriminate between business and leisure passengers. On the
dynamic of prices for perishable goods, Gallego and van Ryzin (1994) present a theoretical
model that allows prices to adjust dynamically based on inventories and time to departure,
while Deneckere and Peck (2012) develop a dynamic model of perfectly competitive price
posting. Empirically, Sweeting (2012) uses Major League Baseball tickets to study the
seller’s pricing behavior in secondary markets, and Escobari (2012) estimates a dynamic
pricing model for airline tickets and finds aggregate demand learning by airlines.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 explains the data, while the
empirical strategy is presented in Section 3. The estimation results and a discussion of the
assumptions appear in Sections 4 and 5, respectively. Section 6 concludes.
2 Data
This paper uses an original data set on airline prices collected from a major U.S. Online
Travel Agency (OTA) during a period when this OTA did not charge a booking fee for
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airline tickets. The collection strategy presents two key improvements over a similar data
set used in Stavins (2001). First, we have a panel, which allows us to control for observed
and unobserved heterogeneity across flights, carriers, and routes. Second, we track hourly
changes in posted prices. This unique piece of information is essential to determine whether
there exist within day price dispersion and whether airlines price discriminate based on the
hour-of-the-day the ticket is purchased. Each cross-sectional observation in the sample is
the lowest observed economy fare on a non-stop one-way flight from a carrier on a route,
where a route is a pair of departure and arrival U.S. airports. Each flight is observed every
hour starting at 59 days in advance until the departure date. We have 158 domestic flights
in 158 different airport pairs. The carriers in the sample are American Airlines, Alaska,
JetBlue, Delta, Frontier, AirTran Airways, United, US Airways, and Virgin America, with
the proportion of flights of each carriers chosen to be close to its share in the U.S. market.3
Following Stavins (2001) and Escobari (2012) to control for any departure day effect on
fares, all non-stop, one-way flights depart on a single day: Thursday July 12, 2012. We
argue that the ex-ante high demand period of the 4th of July is distant enough from our
chosen departure date. Hence, our fares are likely capture the typical demand during
summer travel.4 Because our data involves airports located in different time zones, the
time we record for each of the flights is the one associated with the originating airport.
The high frequency posted price data we utilize was specifically gathered to study the
dynamics of prices within the same day to departure. The widely used and more aggregate
DB1B transaction data from the Bureau of Transportation Statistics (e.g., see Borenstein
and Rose, 1994; and Gerardi and Shapiro, 2009) just does not have this level of information.5
In addition to much more detailed information, a less apparent advantage of using posted
prices is the possibility of directly observing the behavior of the seller every hour —this is
true whether a transaction occurs or not. With transaction data the econometrician is only
able to observe the behavior of buyers and sellers once a sale occurs. Moreover, because
we observe equilibrium prices in which the sellers take into account the optimal behavior
3The only major U.S. carrier excluded from the sample is Southwest, whose fares only appear on South-
west.com.
4The Memorial Day holiday, May 28, is also relatively far from our chosen departure date.
5A recent study with detailed transaction data at the ticket level is Hernandez and Wiggins (2014). They
empirically examine the effect of competitive conditions on nonlinear pricing strategies.
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of the buyers when posting their fares, we implicitly observe the behavior of buyers.
Borenstein and Rose (1994) explain how price dispersion in the airline industry comes
from multiple sources. The data collection and the estimation approach controls for these
multiple sources and allows us to isolate the price differences across purchase times within
the same flight and within the same day to departure. We keep track of the price of the
non-refundable economy-class ticket at every hour prior to departure. This controls for the
existence of tickets sold with frequent flier miles, different fare classes, and refundable tickets
(see, e.g., Escobari and Jindapon, 2014). The existence of price differences associated with
Saturday-night stayover, minimum and maximum stay are controlled for by focusing on
one-way flights.6 Moreover, selecting non-stop flights is helpful to control for connecting
flights and more complicated itineraries (e.g., open jaws). Note that while we focus on one-
way tickets, extending our results to round-trip tickets would need to follow the standard
assumption in the literature where the price of a round-trip ticket is assumed to be two
times the price of a one-way ticket (see, e.g., Borenstein and Rose, 1994, p. 677; and
Gerardi and Shapiro, 2009, p. 5). Our data does not allow us to test this assumption.
Generalizing our results to the U.S. airline industry would require more assumptions as the
existence of different ticket characteristics make price discrimination in airlines a complex
multidimensional screening problem (Armstrong, 1996). Our data on one-way fares greatly
helps us to simplify the complexity of pricing strategies and is in line with the vast majority
of the single-leg (i.e., one-way) theoretical models that help explain price dispersion (see,
e.g., Gallego and van Ryzin, 1994; and Dana, 1998).
3 Empirical Strategy
3.1 Pricing Equation
We estimate the following equation to capture the hour-of-day purchase effect on prices:
LnFareijt = βHourt +
59∑
k=0
γkI[Advt=k] + vij + εijt, (1)
6Under this data collection strategy if a particular flight is the the back-end (return portion) of a round
trip ticket, it will not enter in our sample. It only enters if it was bought as a separate one-way ticket.
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where i denotes the flight, j the airport pair, and t is time. LnFareijt is the logarithm of
the price and Hourt is the matrix with the hour-of-day dummies with the hour of the day
corresponding to the time at the departing airport. Hence, β is the vector of coefficients
of interest. I[Advt=k] is an indicator variable equal to one if the number of days prior to
departure (Advt) is equal to k, zero otherwise. vij is the flight and airport-pair specific
effect, while εijt is the remaining disturbance.
Notice that despite its very simple structure, Equation 1 is actually very powerful.
Because we have twenty-four observations within the same day prior to departure, we can
estimate the model while controlling for the effect of days in advance with daily dummies.
This takes into account any (linear or nonlinear) effect that Advt can have on fares —e.g.,
intertemporal price discrimination based on advance purchase requirements and any day-
of-the-week purchase effect. Moreover, the fixed effect vij controls for time-invariant flight-,
carrier-, and airport-pair-specific characteristics. This includes all of the controls included
in price dispersion models that use either Bureau of Transportation Statistics data (e.g.,
Borenstein and Rose, 1994, and Gerardi and Shapiro, 2009) or posted prices data (e.g.,
Stavins, 2001, and Gaggero and Piga, 2011). Examples of flight-specific characteristics
include aircraft size, departure time, hub effect at the flight level, and systematic peak-load
pricing.7 Carrier-specific characteristics include managerial capacity, while airport-pair-
specific characteristics include the Herfindal index, distance between airport pairs, and any
hub effect that affects prices at the airport level.
3.2 Dynamic Pricing
One constraint with the estimation of Equation 1 via OLS or fixed effects is that it would
assume that sellers and buyers are myopic. This means that sellers do not consider previous
prices when posting the current price and do not have any beliefs about future prices either.
Likewise, buyers that observe the current posted price must make a buying decision with no
information about previous prices nor any beliefs about future prices. This is an important
constraint because the airline pricing problem is dynamic in nature and agents can behave
dynamically. Consumers can easily search posted prices through online travel agencies and
observe part of the pricing sequence before deciding to buy. In fact, online travel metasearch
7This one arises due to congestion known at the time the flight is scheduled (see, e.g., Escobari, 2009).
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engine Kayak (acquired by Priceline.com in 2012) now provides consumers with both a price
trend and a buy recommendation. Beliefs are important because when consumers observe
the current price they may decide to postpone their purchase decision if they believe that
prices are likely to be lower in the future.
A model consistent with agents behaving dynamically, as explained in Arellano and
Bond (1991) (see also Bun and Kiviet, 2006), involves the estimation of the following
dynamic pricing equation:
LnFareijt = αLnFareij,t−1 + βHourt +
59∑
k=0
γkI[Adv=k] + vij + εijt. (2)
While the coefficient α is not of direct interest, the variable LnFareij,t−1 is needed to
incorporate dynamics. Equation 2 indicates that current prices depend on previous prices
(lagged prices), but given the nature of the autoregressive term current prices depend on all
previous prices and previous shocks. In the estimation of Equation 2 we treat LnFareij,t−1
as endogenous. Hence LnFareij,t−1 is allowed to be correlated with εijt and earlier shocks,
but not with εij,t+1 and future shocks. Of course, both the hour-of-the-day and the day-
in-advance dummies are treated as strictly exogenous.
While we do not model agents’ beliefs and we cannot conclude that agents are for-
ward looking, endogenous LnFareij,t−1 along with a no serial correlation assumption of
εijt implies that our estimation is consistent with agents (buyers and sellers) that can be-
have dynamically. Sellers use Equation 2 to set prices, while buyers can use previous and
current posted prices (and Equation 2 under rational expectations) to form beliefs about
future prices. Heterogeneity across consumers on arrival rates and expectation formations
determines whether consumers purchase the airline ticket and when they buy. Serially
uncorrelated εijt does not prevent buyers from forming expectations about future prices,
rather it suggests that buyers cannot predict future price shocks based on previous infor-
mation.
To obtain consistent estimates of (α, β, γ), equation 2 is estimated using the methods
described in Arellano and Bond (1991). We take the first differences of Equation 2 to
eliminate the fixed effect term vij . Then we use the resulting error term ∆εijt to construct
the moments E(∆εijtM), where we need a matrix of instruments M to obtain (αˆ, βˆ, γˆ) via
GMM. Because Hourt and
∑59
k=0 γkI[Adv=k] are treated as strictly exogenous, they serve
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as their own instruments. The endogeneity assumption of LnFareij,t−1 along with lack of
serial correlation of εijt implies that lagged values of LnFareijt are valid instruments for
∆ LnFareij,t−1.
3.3 Dynamic Price Discrimination
Two necessary conditions must be satisfied for price discrimination to exist: (i) different
valuations across consumer types, and (ii) the seller’s ability to prevent arbitrage. Airlines
can restrict arbitrage by not allowing low valuation consumers to resell tickets to high
valuation consumers. To completely avoid arbitrage, however, the airline also needs to
prevent high valuation types from buying tickets marketed for low valuation consumers.
Price discrimination models based on mechanism design call this the incentive compatibility
constraint. In a simple two-type model, the pricing scheme should be such that high
valuation consumers are forced to reveal their type and can only buy higher priced tickets.
Airlines price discriminate in multiple dimensions and aim to separate consumer types in
different categories by using ‘fences’ such as refundability of the ticket, Saturday-night
stayover, or fare classes.8 In this paper we control for these multiple fences and focus on a
single price discrimination dimension, the hour-of-day purchase of homogeneous tickets for
the same flight within the same number of days before departure.
We follow McAfee and te Velde (2007) and refer to dynamic price discrimination as the
practice of charging different consumer types distinct markups over marginal cost based
on the time of purchase. The price dispersion within the same flight and within the same
number of days before departure are captured by the vector β in Equations 1 and 2, with
the 1:00 a.m. dummy serving as the omitted category.
To motivate the empirical approach and findings consider the existence of two consumer
types. On the one hand, we have business travelers —or high type— who have high
reservation values for a ticket and usually buy tickets through their offices representatives
or travel agents during normal office hours. On the other hand, there are leisure travelers
—or low type— who have lower valuations and lower costs for searching and buying tickets
during the evening. Of course, leisure travelers are not restricted to buy tickets only in the
8Multidimensional screening problems are difficult to characterize theoretically because of the continuum
of boundary conditions (see, e.g., Armstrong, 1996).
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evening. They could purchase airline tickets before going to work, however, mobile web
browsing traffic immediately before office hours (7-8 a.m.) is only half the level compared
to evening hours (9 pm).9 A more likely scenario is that leisure travelers search for airfares
during their lunch break while at work. Given that consumers are visiting an average of
38 web sites before booking a trip,10 it is unlikely that a leisure traveler will complete
their travel booking during a lunch break. Instead, we believe that leisure passengers will
continue their search and complete their travel booking in the evening. The mechanism that
sellers use to prevent arbitrage is simple, offer higher priced tickets during office hours and
lower priced tickets during the evening. Discrimination based on hour-of-the-day purchase
is considered third-degree price discrimination, since the seller knows the distribution of
consumers’ valuations.
4 Estimation Results
4.1 Pricing Equation
Table 1 presents the summary statistics. The initial results from the estimation of Equa-
tion 1 appear in Table 2. To gain a better understanding of the problem, the different
columns of Table 2 include different sets of fixed effects and controls for days to departure
and day-of-week dummies. Because office hours are only relevant Monday through Friday,
we begin the analysis by restricting the sample to include only weekdays. We later include
weekend data in additional specifications to provide some robustness checks on the main
findings. The first three specifications do not include the days-to-departure fixed effects,
hence we are able to identify the day-of-the-week and the day-in-advance effects on pricing.
Note that because these specifications do not control for day-in-advance effects, it would
be difficult to generalize the observed price differences to flights that do not depart on
Thursdays.
[Table 1, about here]
9See chitika.com/browsing-activity-by-hour (accessed 9 August 2017).
10See www.travelmarketreport.com/articles/Consumers-Visit-38-Sites-Before-Booking-Expedia-Says (ac-
cessed 9 August 2017).
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Different prices over different days of the week can be interpreted as price discriminatory
only under strong assumptions. First, there needs to be a mechanism to prevent high-
valuation consumers from imitating the behavior of lower valuation consumers. That is, a
mechanism that prevents people from easily switching their purchase days. Second, capacity
costs across different days must be the comparable. This may be a concern because capacity
constraints along with uncertain demand means that the opportunity cost of a seat changes
depending on the expected demand (see Escobari, 2012). Expectations are updated as the
departure date nears, hence inducing cost variation across different days.
[Table 2, about here]
Our main focus on Table 2 are the hour-of-day coefficients. The estimates in the last
column show that when compared to 1:00 a.m. —the omitted category— fares are 1.0%
more expensive at 3:00 a.m., with higher fares being statistically significant until 10:00
a.m.11 The spike at 3:00 a.m. is consistent with airlines updating their fares upward after
midnight when few travelers search for tickets (information we received from people in
the industry). Between 11:00 a.m. and 7:00 p.m., fares are not significantly different to
fares at 1:00 a.m. Finally, we find the lowest fares between 8:00 p.m. (0.3% lower) and
midnight (0.1% lower). There are two plausible scenarios that could potential explain what
we are observing in these hourly price changes. One scenario is that carriers adjust prices
upward in the early morning hours (at 3 a.m. EST) in hopes that these price increases
will stick.12 Our findings suggest that such increases do not consistently “stick” since we
find prices are declining throughout the day reaching a bottom in the evening. A second
plausible scenario which is consistent with the observed pricing patterns is that carriers are
charging higher prices during the day when price inelastic consumers are shopping for fares
(business travelers) and lower fares in the evening when more price sensitive consumers are
fare shopping (leisure travelers).
The easiest way to interpret these coefficients is as within-day and within-flight price
dispersion. With constant costs and if consumers do not wait to purchase later within the
same day, the observed price dispersion in Table 2 can be interpreted as price discrimination
11The interpretation takes into account that the dependent variable is LnFareijt × 1000.
12For more information on price leadership in the airline industry see Morrison and Winston (2010).
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based on time-of-day purchase.13 This is in line with Basso et al. (2009), where agency
problems’ incentives make the demand of business travelers more inelastic.14 The difference
in fares between office hours and evening hours is at its largest of 1.0% when comparing
prices at 9:00 a.m. versus 10:00 p.m. At the average one-way ticket price of $375.30, this
difference represents $3.74. From the point of view of many buyers, these differences might
not be economically significant. From the perspective of the sellers, however, a nearly $4
higher ticket price has large revenue implications given the size of the market —with 813
million U.S. passenger enplanements in 2012 (Bureau of Transportation Statistics).
Our discussion later on focuses on the existence of two consumer types when we ag-
gregate the hourly dummies to capture an office-hours effect. This is helpful to motivate
the incentive compatibility constraint that prevents high valuation consumers from buying
tickets marketed to low valuation types. However, airlines have many years of information
on prices and sales patterns for different flights and departure dates. Based on the estimates
on Table 2 that show within-day and within-flight price variation, it is reasonable to argue
that airlines have good estimates of the different expected consumer price sensitiveness for
purchases at different hours of the day. The observe price differentials are consistent with
the claim that airlines price discriminate based on a continuum of traveler types with price
sensitiveness that continuously change throughout the day. During early hours of the day
higher posted fares suggest that consumers are less price sensitive. It is in the nature of
yield management that the pricing strategies work on expectations but they do not have to
work for every consumer or even every flight.15 This means that airlines will still have some
low valuation consumers, for example, buying early in the morning or some high valuation
consumers buying at 11:00 pm when fares are at its lowest (based on column 1). However,
on expectations the price variation reported in Table 2 is consistent with airlines having a
13We also control for capacity costs within the same day to departure to support the existence of a
particular dynamic price discrimination component.
14In their model Frequent Flier Programs “bribe” employees to book flights at higher prices. This occurs
because an employee selecting the airline will not necessarily have the right incentives to find the lowest
possible price when an employer is paying the bill.
15For example, based on aggregate demand expectations airlines might follow an particular overbooking
policy. Yet, after they observe the aggregate demand realization they might still need to offer compensation
to passengers who did not get a seat or might still fly with empty seats.
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good idea of the variation in the price sensitiveness within the same day to departure.
Note that the error in Equation 1 is unlikely to be independent across observations.
Having day-in-advance fixed effects and flight fixed effects will absorb away common shocks
(e.g., common cost shocks), and this is helpful if the potential within day-in-advance and
within flight correlation of errors is driven by a common shock process. To further allow
for correlation between errors within clusters Table 2 reports White heteroscedasticity-
consistent estimates of the asymptotic standard errors, clustered at the carrier level. Cameron
and Miller (2015) explain that there is no formal test to assess the clustering level. The
consensus described in Cameron and Miller (2015) is to be conservative by aggregating
clusters when possible and that a reasonable approach is to cluster at progressively higher
levels and stop when there is little change in the standard errors. Our clustering level
follows this argument as we progressively clustered at the flight, route and carrier levels.
4.2 Days to Departure Dynamics and Consumers’ Heterogeneity
Days to departure plays an important role in our analysis because of the heterogeneity
across consumers that buy at different points prior to departure, and because consumers
can behave dynamically by forming expectations and delaying their purchase decisions. To
address how consumers’ heterogeneity affects our results, Table 3 presents the dynamic
panel estimates of Equation 2. We use different subsamples of the data across columns,
broken down into four groups depending of the number of weeks prior to departure. The
cutoffs Adv = 14.8 and 29.6 allow us to focus on the first quarter of the data (Adv < 14.8)
and also evenly splits the sample in half (before and after Adv = 29.6). The differences in
the estimates across columns show strong evidence that price dispersion or price discrimi-
nation (under stronger assumptions) through hour-of-day is larger the closer to departure.
For example, during the last two weeks (when 0 ≤ Adv < 14.8) there are significant price
differences between 6:00 a.m. and 6:00 p.m. of 0.51% (or $2.11) in the average priced ticket
(purchased within 14 days of departure), while this difference is smaller for ticket purchases
made further in advance (column 3).
[Table 3, about here]
The explanation behind these results is simple and intuitive. The proportion of leisure
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travelers making advance purchases is larger earlier in the sales season, hence the seller
has little incentive to try to separate across types and rather opts to pool traveler types
together by charging nearly the same price throughout the day. As the departure date
nears, however, the proportion of business travelers becomes larger, and hence it becomes
advantageous for an airline to follow a separating strategy. During the last two weeks fares
are more expensive early in the morning and during office hours, while they are lower in
the evening (between 9:00 p.m. and 11:00 p.m.) With constant costs we interpret this
difference as price discriminatory because of the difficulty that business travelers have in
purchasing tickets in the evening (outside of typical office hours).
Because the estimates in Table 3 treat LnFareij,t−1 as endogenous, we need a vector
M of instruments for the moments E(∆εijtM) that come from first differencing Equation 2.
We use LnFareij,t−2 and LnFareij,t−3 as instruments for ∆LnFareij,t−2.16 We use two
tests to address the validity of the dynamic panel specifications. Across all columns we
observe large p-values associated with the serial correlation test. This provides strong
evidence for a valid specification —the error term εijt is not serially correlated. Moreover,
the Sargan test for over-identifying restrictions to test the null that the instruments are not
correlated with the residuals also provides strong evidence for a valid specification across
all columns. For the standard errors we compared the one-step GMM robust standard
errors clustered at the flight, route and carrier levels (see, Roodman, 2009) with the two-
step GMM robust standard errors that include the Windmeijer finite-sample correction.
Without the correction, Windmeijer (2005) explains that the standard errors tend to be
severely downward biased. Following Cameron and Miller (2015), in a similar conservative
approach than in the static estimation we use the Windmeijer finite-sample correction
because it provides larger standard errors.
The estimates for the hour-of-day dummies in the first column (within two weeks prior
to departure) show that fares are the least expensive at 9:00 p.m. followed by 6:00 p.m.
Fares are the most expensive in the early morning hours, reaching a peak at 3:00 a.m. The
range of prices reaches its maximum when comparing fares between 9:00 p.m. and 3:00 a.m.
where the difference is about 2.30% or $9.56 —as evaluated at the mean Fare of $415.8
16As a robustness check we also use a different selection of instruments in the matrix M and find similar
results.
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within two weeks to departure. After the peak, fares remain high during office hours, yet
continue to decline during the day, with the lowest fares occurring in the evening (after 6
p.m.). As the departure date nears and the proportion of business travelers increase, we
observe higher airline prices during normal office hours. Moreover, lower fares are found
later in the evening when leisure travelers typically search for tickets. The estimates across
different columns reveal that the pattern of price discrimination is not the same at different
days prior to departure. For example, well in advance of departure (column 3), when the
proportion of business travelers is small, we find the lowest hourly ticket prices occur at 11
a.m. This result, however, is not robust when comparing models 2 and 3, and it is difficult
to interpret due to the large number of dummy variables.
[Table 4, about here]
Table 4 consolidates the twenty-three hour dummies into three categories in an effort to
capture the office-hours effect. The idea is to group the potentially continuum of different
consumers types and focus on the difference between office and evening prices. Office
is a dummy variable which equals one between 9:00 a.m. and 4:59 p.m., zero otherwise.
The variable Evening equals one between 5:00 p.m. and 11:59 p.m., zero otherwise. The
omitted category is Morning (from 12:00 a.m. to 8:59 a.m.). All nine sets of estimates
across columns pass both of the specification tests; there is no serial correlation and Sargan
tests provide strong evidence that we have valid instruments.
The second half of Table 4 provides direct estimates of the price discrimination com-
ponent by comparing the marginal effects of Office and Evening on fares. Column 1
focuses on the last month prior to departure and finds that fares during office hours are
0.093% ($0.36) higher. When focusing between 29.6 and 59.3 days to departure column 4
shows no evidence of a price discrimination effect. Overall when using the entire sample
of fares, the effect is small —fares are 0.037% ($0.14) more expensive (column 7)— mainly
because early in the selling season there is no effect. To further analyze the role of days to
departure we include the interaction terms Office×Adv and Evening×Adv in columns
2, 5, and 8 of Table 4.17 The results show that price discrimination is greater closer to
17The omitted category is Morning×Adv. Since we control for the day in advance effect by using day
dummies we allow for a very flexible nonlinear relationship between Adv and LnFare. As a result, the
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departure when the proportion of business travelers is greater. The estimates in column
2 indicate that at one week to departure (Adv= 7) fares during office hours are 0.25%
($1.04) more expensive.18 At earlier dates the effect is smaller.
Note that the negative and statistically significant coefficients on Office and Evening
(e.g., in columns 1, 4, and 7), mean that early morning prices are higher. There is nothing
that prevents leisure travelers (that perhaps hold a regular nine-to-five job) from buying
tickets early in the morning or at anytime during the day. However, given the pricing
structure, leisure travelers reveal their type and buy at lower prices during the evening
(when comparing to higher prices they face early in the morning or during office hours).
This flexibility on when tourist travelers can buy is easy to understand in a simple price
discrimination framework with two consumer types (Varian, 1989). In a two-type model
we can characterize the problem with two participation constraints and two incentive-
compatibility constraints.19 The seller adopts a pricing strategy such that one participation
constraint and one incentive-compatibility constraint are binding. In our setting the pricing
strategy makes the tourists’ incentive compatibility constrain to be binding —tourists reveal
their unobserved (to the seller) type by buying at lower prices during the evening. Of course,
tourists do not want to pretend to be business travelers and buy at higher prices during
the office hours. The key element to be able to interpret our results as price discrimination
is that business travelers cannot pretend to be tourists and benefit from lower prices. This
is achieved due to the restriction that business travelers can only buy during office hours.
To determine which intraday price fluctuation scenario better fits our data, we also
examine weekend fares separately. If airlines are trying to pass along price increases by
hiking fares early in the morning only to see them fall throughout the day when other
carriers fail to match the increase, then we should also expect to see similar price dynamics
on the weekend. However, if the airlines are charging different prices based on consumer
types (business or leisure traveler) then on days when a single type of traveler is searching for
coefficients on the interaction terms do not capture the marginal effect relative to the omitted category.
Hence we include both Office and Evening interaction terms with Adv. The difference (evaluated at
some value of Adv) captures the price discrimination effect.
182.502/1000×100=0.25%. $415.8×0.25%=$1.04.
19See, e.g., page 613 on Varian (1989), page 3 on Escobari and Jindapon (2014), or Maskin and Riley
(1984) for a general framework.
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airline tickets (i.e., leisure travelers on the weekend), then the hourly posted prices should
not change on the weekend. In sum, our argument of business and leisure travelers buying
at different times of the day does not work for weekends, hence our approach is to focus on
the weekday portion of the data. Prior research has found larger price dispersion for posted
prices of airfares occurs on weekends (Mantin and Koo, 2010). Therefore we use weekends
as an interesting exogenous factor that affects pricing dynamics and our weekend results
can help us validate our findings. Based on our description of leisure and business travelers,
only leisure travelers buy on weekends with no restriction on the hour of the day they can
buy. Columns 3, 6, and 9 in Table 4 present the results for one-month in advance, two-
months in advance and the whole sample respectively. When compared to the weekdays,
the weekend estimates of Office and Evening are smaller in magnitude, suggesting that
the differences between prices during Morning the rest of the day is much smaller during
the weekends. Moreover, the difference between Office and Evening is now negative and
statistically significant for the last month to departure (column 3) and for the whole sample
(column 9). This suggests that weekend shoppers of airline ticket prices can find slightly
lower prices one month prior to departure during office hours -0.064% ($0.25) compared to
evenings. For the entire sample, once again compared to evenings lower weekend prices can
also found during offices hours -0.028% ($0.11). There is no difference two months prior to
departure (column 6). These weekend findings are consistent with the price discrimination
scenario since we document an office hour premium occurs solely during weekdays.20
4.3 Carrier’s Identity and Market Structure
To further explore the factors that can affect the observed price discrimination we run three
additional specifications. In the first specification we separate legacy carriers from low-cost
carriers (LCC). The second specification assesses the role of market structure, while the
third explores the identity of the carriers.
20Escobari (2012) and Alderighi et al. (2015) use load factor (Load) to measure the proportion of the seats
already sold. With Load, a simplified version of the model would be: LnFare = γOffice + θLoad + u.
Evening is the omitted category and price discrimination is directly captured by γ. If Load is omitted, δ
is the slope when regressing Load on Office, and γˆ is the OLS estimator, then E(γˆ) = γ+ θ× δ. Escobari
(2012) and Alderighi et al. (2015) find that θ > 0. Moreover, δ < 0 as airlines sell tickets throughout the
day. Hence, θ × δ < 0 means that γ would underestimate the price discrimination effect.
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[Table 5, about here]
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 5 report the estimates for the legacy carries (American,
Alaska, Delta, United, and US Airways), while columns 3 and 4 represent LCCs (JetBlue,
Frontier, Airtran, and Virgin). The distinction in this table is important as low-cost carri-
ers have a lower operating cost structure and typically offer lower fares than legacy carriers.
Consistent with the previous estimates, price discrimination based on office-hours is posi-
tive, statistically significant, and becomes more prevalent the closer to departure. We find
that price discrimination is more pronounced for LCCs than legacy carriers. Specifically,
when interpreted as a percentage change the magnitude of the price discrimination point
estimate at Adv = 7 during the month prior to departure for the LCC is about four times
larger ($6.05) than the estimate for the legacy carriers ($1.58). From columns 1 and 3 we
see that at Adv = 7 the legacy fare is about 0.16% ($0.65) more expensive during office
hours compared to the larger 0.6% ($1.36) for the LCC.21
[Table 6, about here]
To assess the role of competition on price discrimination the specifications reported on
Table 6 include the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). This research question is of interest
given the findings by Gerardi and Shapiro (2009) that price dispersion decreases with
competition, in line with the textbook treatment of price discrimination. This was further
analyzed in Dai et al. (2014), who find a nonlinear relationship between price dispersion
and market concentration. In our specifications HHI captures market concentration and it
is constructed at the route level with market share based on the number of nonstop flights
with the same departure date.
The office-hour price discrimination estimates in Table 6 are presented for three different
values of the HHI: 0.52 (first quartile), 0.78 (median), and 1 (third quartile). These
relatively high values for the different quartiles of HHI are evidence of a relatively high level
of concentration. The price discrimination estimates during the last month to departure
(column 1) show a statistically significant effect for the second and third quartiles of the
21The dollar estimates use the average fares during the last month to departure for LCCs ($225.65) and
for legacy carriers ($411.31).
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HHI.22 The same is true for the third quartile of the HHI using the whole sample (column
3). While the price discrimination point estimates are greater for higher values of the HHI,
the difference is not statistically significant.
Table 7 presents the dynamic panel estimates when running separate regressions by
airline. These specifications are informative to assess whether our office-hours price dis-
crimination findings are common to all carriers or if they are generated by the activity
of only a few companies. The results show statistically significant price discrimination
for American, Frontier, AirTran, and United, with noticeably larger magnitudes of price
discrimination for the LCC’s Frontier ($7.05) and AirTran ($8.89). Perhaps, Frontier and
AirTran, which have a substantial component of leisure travelers, offer lower prices in the
evening to attract bookings from price sensitive leisure travelers. Overall, consistent with
the findings in Bilotkach et al. (2010), we interpret these results as evidence of heterogene-
ity across carriers when implementing pricing strategies within the same day-to-departure.
This observed heterogeneity can have important implications, for example, on the reported
“hub premiums”. Lee and Luengo-Prado (2005) find that although average prices to and
from hub airports tend to be higher, much of the difference can be explained by the pro-
portion of leisure versus business travelers.
[Table 7, about here]
These estimates should be interpreted with care as the sample size for some carriers
might not be large enough to allow us to obtain precise estimates. In particular, from the
summary statistics in Table 1 we can see that the regressions for Frontier and Virgin are
based only on a single flight each. Moreover, each specification in Table 7 has a fairly large
number of days to departure dummies that are allowed to differ across columns, and there
might be some underlying flight specific characteristics that change across carriers (e.g.,
the sample of routes differs for each carrier).
22Following Stavins (2001) we assume HHI is exogenous. Note that unlike Stavins (2001) we have a panel
and we further control for flight fixed effects. In our specifications these fixed effects span the instruments
for HHI proposed in Borenstein and Rose (1994) and used in Gerardi and Shapiro (2009).
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5 Discussion
In this section we further discuss four elements behind our price discrimination interpreta-
tion of the results. First, our price discrimination interpretation holds as long as business
travelers buy tickets during normal business hours and leisure travelers buy tickets later
in the evening. As we discuss throughout the document, it is reasonable to argue that
business travelers buy during office hours at higher prices since they buy their tickets via
their workplaces. On the other hand, tourists have more flexibility on the time of the day
at which they can buy; hence, is it easy to see why they would buy in the evening taking
advantage of the lower prices offered at that time of the day. Notice that none of these two
groups of travelers have incentives to buy early in the morning as those prices are higher
(see Table 4).
Second, airlines use historical data and have a good idea of the different price sensitive-
ness of consumers that buy at different times of the day. This means that they know that
they can charge higher prices during business hours and lower prices later in the evening.
While we provide various robustness checks in the empirical analysis (e.g., costs, weekdays
vs. weekends, days to departure, market concentration, legacy vs. low cost carriers), there
might be other changing market conditions not controlled for in our empirical specification
that we are not aware of. The ATPCO, a leader in the collection and distribution of airline
fare data worldwide to online travel agents, indicates on their web site that fare distribution
“occurs as often as once an hour, allowing airlines to respond to market conditions as they
change”.23
Third, we interpret the price differences as price discrimination. As argued throughout
the paper, we believe this is the case because we control for costs and we focus on an ho-
mogeneous product —an economy class ticket. One potential alternative explanation that
might drive price differences could be differences in quality (e.g., if business travelers were
buying tickets of a higher quality than tourists). This might occur if the seller system-
atically changes the booking (sub)class within the same economy class at the same time
we observe price changes between office hours and evening. However, we do not believe
that is the case as the main differences in tickets within economy class are restrictions on
23www.atpco.net/life-cycle-fare accessed 19 May 2017.
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the days to departure, refundability, high-season tickets, and long-haul. Our empirical ap-
proach is already controlling for days to departure, refundability, departure date and route
characteristics.
Fourth, we follow the large and growing literature that uses posted prices and assume
that the observed prices from the OTA are the prices at which a ticket can be purchased. Of
course, this also includes the (implicit) assumption common in the literature that airlines
are the ones that decide prices, not the OTA. Even though the contractual arrangements
between airlines and the OTA are confidential, it is reasonable to argue that airlines will
not let the OTA have the power to change prices.24 During the time period of the data
collection the major OTA we used did not charge a booking fee, which means that the price
we recorded from the OTA was the same price found in the carriers’ websites.25
6 Conclusion
Capturing dynamic price discrimination for a perishable good that sells in advance under
demand uncertainty is a challenging task because the marginal cost of a seat changes daily
in advance of departure depending on demand expectations. Hence any variation in fares
between days cannot be labeled as price discriminatory due to fluctuating seat inventories
and demand expectations. In this paper we follow a novel approach to measure price
discrimination by using an original data set that tracks hourly posted airline prices for
sixty days prior to depature. We use these data to estimate price differences based on
time-of-day purchase within the same flight and within the same day to departure.
We find that fares increase by approximately $6.50 between 2 a.m. and 3 a.m., with the
highest average hourly posted fares occuring at 3 a.m. (EST) or midnight (PST). Average
hourly posted fares steadily decline throughout the day reaching their lowest levels at 9 p.m.
(EST). These findings suggest two plausible scenarios for these hourly price changes. One
24It makes little sense to believe that the OTA has the power to control prices. It would be difficult to
imagine that a single agent (an OTA) will be given the power to change prices of different airlines that are
expected to compete with each other. Moreover, it is also difficult to believe that a carrier will give the
OTA the power to change prices and shift potential consumers to the competition.
25For evidence that airlines and OTA have the same prices, see, e.g., S. Pascarella, USA Today, 27 Aug
2009 —“Face-off: Airline websites vs. online travel agencies.”
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scenario is that carriers initiate fare increases during the early morning hours. Declining
fares during the day suggests that competing carriers have chosen not to match these fare
increases. An alternative scenario is that these results are in line with the theoretical
prediction of textbook price discrimination models. The sellers separate between consumer
types based on the time of day that they purchase the ticket. We find that as the departure
date nears higher posted prices occur during office hours (between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m.),
while lower prices are found later in the evening (between 5pm and midnight). This result
is consistent with airfares being higher for business travelers which make ticket purchases
during working hours and leisure travelers with lower valuations who purchase tickets in
the evening.
We also note that this price discrimination effect appears larger for tickets purchased
closer to departure when the proportion of business travelers is higher. Specifically, we
find that fares at seven days to departure during office hours are 0.25% ($1.04) higher
compared to evening posted fares. Hence for a consumer making a round-trip purchase,
doing so during office hours (rather than in the evening) adds about $2.08 to the ticket
price.26 Even if business travelers are forward looking and have beliefs of lower prices later
in the evening, dynamic price discrimination on the part of the carriers is effective because
business travelers will likely continue to buy airline tickets during office hours through their
office representatives. While we have provided two plausible scenarios above to describe
the observed hourly fluctuations in posted prices, there is one additional piece of evidence
which favors the price discrimination scenario instead of airlines unsuccesfully attempting
to raise prices early in the morning. Examining weekend posted prices data, when leisure
travelers have no restrictions on when they can browse the Internet for airfares, we find no
difference between office hours and evening posted fares. Hence the office hours premium
is solely a weekday phenomena and the price dispersion estimates are much larger within
two weeks of departure, e.g., fares for the same flight are $9.56 more expensive ($19.12 for
round-trip tickets) at 3:00 a.m. than at 9:00 p.m. of the same day. In sum, our findings are
consistent with the claim that carriers are price discriminating as we find slightly higher
26This last calculation follows the standard assumption in the airline literature that the round-trip price
is two times the one-way price. See for example Borenstein and Rose (1994, p. 677), and Gerardi and
Shapiro (2009, p. 5).
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posted prices during office hours and lower posted prices in the evenings during weekdays.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables mean sd min max
Fareijt:
Whole sample 375.3 223.0 58 1,288
0 ≤ Advt < 14.8 415.8 212.3 86.80 1,288
14.8 ≤ Advt < 29.6 358.2 226.0 58 968
29.6 ≤ Advt < 44.4 364.0 223.9 58 973
44.4 ≤ Advt < 59.3 370.1 223.7 58 968
Advt 29.91 16.64 0 59.3
HHIij 0.780 0.259 0.2 1
Low Costij 0.125 0.331 0 1
Days of week:
Mondayt 0.184 0.387 0 1
Tuesdayt 0.209 0.407 0 1
Wednesdayt 0.206 0.405 0 1
Thursdayt 0.205 0.404 0 1
Fridayt 0.196 0.397 0 1
Carriers:
Americanij 0.299 0.458 0 1
Alaskaij 0.018 0.134 0 1
JetBlueij 0.066 0.249 0 1
Deltaij 0.117 0.322 0 1
Frontierij 0.006 0.078 0 1
AirTranij 0.046 0.209 0 1
Unitedij 0.348 0.476 0 1
US Airwaysij 0.091 0.288 0 1
Virginij 0.007 0.083 0 1
Notes: The sample size is 145,458.
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Table 2: Pricing Equation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables Coef StErr Coef StErr Coef StErr Coef StErr
2:00 a.m. 3.341* (0.949) 3.319* (0.971) 3.333* (0.955) 3.589* (1.008)
3:00 a.m. 9.775* (2.938) 9.819* (2.937) 9.768† (2.925) 10.06* (2.874)
4:00 a.m. 9.265* (3.275) 9.360* (3.274) 9.260† (3.263) 9.792† (3.278)
5:00 a.m. 8.392† (3.296) 8.443† (3.301) 8.381† (3.282) 8.555† (3.223)
6:00 a.m. 7.993* (2.939) 8.054* (2.921) 7.978† (2.929) 7.803† (2.847)
7:00 a.m. 8.437* (2.855) 8.478* (2.849) 8.415† (2.847) 7.825† (2.938)
8:00 a.m. 8.284* (2.662) 8.307* (2.653) 8.280† (2.653) 7.223† (2.788)
9:00 a.m. 7.101* (2.665) 7.173* (2.653) 7.093† (2.653) 5.964‡ (2.803)
10:00 a.m. 5.428† (2.118) 5.485* (2.124) 5.424† (2.106) 4.217‡ (2.142)
11:00 a.m. 3.278† (1.344) 3.338† (1.349) 3.268† (1.335) 1.890 (1.364)
12:00 p.m. 3.376† (1.474) 3.458† (1.478) 3.361‡ (1.463) 1.706 (1.350)
1:00 p.m. 2.935† (1.396) 2.959† (1.392) 2.889‡ (1.389) 1.137 (1.156)
2:00 p.m. 1.749 (1.566) 1.748 (1.572) 1.750 (1.553) 0.130 (1.260)
3:00 p.m. 0.118 (1.808) 0.147 (1.803) 0.126 (1.799) -1.549 (1.454)
4:00 p.m. 0.782 (1.688) 0.776 (1.692) 0.794 (1.677) -1.060 (1.511)
5:00 p.m. 0.885 (1.590) 0.907 (1.584) 0.883 (1.579) -1.218 (1.362)
6:00 p.m. 0.514 (1.461) 0.543 (1.466) 0.512 (1.453) -2.136 (1.419)
7:00 p.m. 0.534 (1.448) 0.562 (1.447) 0.530 (1.438) -2.403 (1.381)
8:00 p.m. 0.367 (1.198) 0.364 (1.202) 0.357 (1.191) -2.992‡ (1.448)
9:00 p.m. 0.0819 (0.787) 0.106 (0.805) 0.0952 (0.791) -3.717† (1.359)
10:00 p.m. -0.584 (0.957) -0.578 (0.970) -0.583 (0.961) -3.997† (1.670)
11:00 p.m. -1.583* (0.520) -1.581* (0.535) -1.578† (0.519) -3.797* (1.124)
12:00 a.m. -0.901* (0.279) -0.891* (0.276) -0.893† (0.279) -1.183* (0.264)
Mondayt -9.826* (3.655) -9.815* (3.667) -9.809† (3.652)
Tuesdayt -18.02* (3.525) -18.00* (3.539) -18.02* (3.530)
Wednesdayt -34.31* (6.441) -34.32* (6.471) -34.31* (6.451)
Thursdayt -34.51* (8.410) -34.51* (8.426) -34.55* (8.381)
Advt -45.04* (9.152) -45.02* (9.158) -45.02* (9.176)
Advt2 1.249* (0.255) 1.248* (0.255) 1.248* (0.255)
Advt3 -0.0106* (0.00229) -0.0106* (0.00229) -0.0106* (0.00229)
Route FE No Yes Yes Yes
Flight FE No No Yes Yes
Adv FE No No No Yes
Within R2 0.308 0.321
Notes: The dependent variable is LnFareijt×1000 and the total number of observations is 145,458. Figures
in parentheses are White heteroskedasticity-consistent estimates of the asymptotic standard errors, clustered
by carrier. ‡ significant at 10%; † significant at 5%; ∗ significant at 1%.
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Table 3: Dynamic Pricing Equation.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sample: 0 ≤ Adv < 14.8 0 ≤ Adv < 29.6 29.6 ≤ Adv < 59.3 0 ≤ Adv < 59.3
Variables Coef StErr Coef StErr Coef StErr Coef StErr
2:00 a.m. 5.201* (1.235) 3.458* (0.758) 0.693* (0.253) 1.936* (0.379)
3:00 a.m. 19.50* (1.264) 10.46* (0.770) 0.979* (0.255) 5.095* (0.383)
4:00 a.m. 3.757* (1.293) 3.534* (0.780) 0.689* (0.256) 1.788* (0.386)
5:00 a.m. 2.466‡ (1.291) 2.680* (0.783) 0.528† (0.258) 1.311* (0.389)
6:00 a.m. 2.766† (1.273) 2.745* (0.784) 0.571† (0.261) 1.373* (0.391)
7:00 a.m. 2.652† (1.284) 2.531* (0.791) 0.399 (0.264) 1.180* (0.395)
8:00 a.m. 1.847 (1.291) 2.101* (0.796) 0.795* (0.268) 1.208* (0.399)
9:00 a.m. 1.262 (1.289) 0.808 (0.798) 0.734* (0.273) 0.529 (0.403)
10:00 a.m. 1.332 (1.292) 0.328 (0.796) -0.454‡ (0.274) -0.348 (0.404)
11:00 a.m. 0.616 (1.294) -0.476 (0.798) -1.155* (0.275) -0.937† (0.405)
12:00 p.m. 0.236 (1.293) 0.179 (0.800) 0.175 (0.275) 0.199 (0.406)
1:00 p.m. 0.491 (1.298) -0.481 (0.803) -0.906* (0.276) -0.807† (0.407)
2:00 p.m. -0.00449 (1.301) -0.826 (0.802) -1.237* (0.277) -1.069* (0.407)
3:00 p.m. 0.197 (1.305) -0.925 (0.801) -0.843* (0.277) -0.833† (0.407)
4:00 p.m. -0.538 (1.303) -0.610 (0.800) -1.202* (0.276) -0.901† (0.406)
5:00 p.m. -0.362 (1.295) -0.841 (0.795) -1.481* (0.274) -1.121* (0.404)
6:00 p.m. -2.302‡ (1.287) -1.670† (0.789) -1.285* (0.272) -1.365* (0.401)
7:00 p.m. -1.414 (1.283) -1.234 (0.785) -1.099* (0.272) -1.083* (0.400)
8:00 p.m. -0.826 (1.276) -0.797 (0.780) -0.900* (0.270) -0.815† (0.397)
9:00 p.m. -3.491* (1.278) -2.377* (0.781) -0.525‡ (0.270) -1.423* (0.398)
10:00 p.m. -1.832 (1.244) -1.589† (0.767) -0.326 (0.264) -0.964† (0.390)
11:00 p.m. -2.005‡ (1.202) -1.846† (0.746) -0.192 (0.257) -1.034* (0.379)
12:00 a.m. 2.309‡ (1.213) -0.00598 (0.255) 0.435 (0.380)
LnFareij,t−1 0.789* (0.0115) 0.630* (0.00856) 0.392* (0.0128) 0.625* (0.00608)
Specification tests:
Serial correlation 1.167 0.0211 0.0297 0.0900
[0.243] [0.983] [0.976] [0.928]
Sargan 322.5 370.5 263.2 443.8
[0.999] [1] [1] [1]
Notes: The dependent variable is LnFareijt × 1000. Figures in parentheses are the Windmeijer finite-sample
corrected standard errors of the GMM two-step estimates. Figures in brackets are p-values. ‡ significant at 10%;
† significant at 5%; ∗ significant at 1%. a The null hypothesis is that the errors in the first-difference regression
exhibit no second-order serial correlation (valid specification). b The null hypothesis is that the instruments are
not correlated with the residuals (valid specification).
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Table 5: Dynamic Price Discrimination. Legacy vs Low Cost Carriers.
Sample: Legacy Low Cost
0 ≤ Adv < 29.6 0 ≤ Adv < 59.3 0 ≤ Adv < 29.6 0 ≤ Adv < 59.3
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables:
Officeta -2.688* -4.077* -5.977† -5.326*
(0.720) (0.364) (2.428) (1.321)
Eveningt -5.274* -5.090* -14.53* -10.88*
(0.718) (0.361) (2.409) (1.305)
Officet ·Advtb -0.0519 0.0656* 0.0861 0.106*
(0.0426) (0.0109) (0.151) (0.0397)
Eveningt ·Advt 0.0927† 0.0966* 0.445* 0.237*
(0.0416) (0.0106) (0.143) (0.0391)
LnFareij,t−1 0.591* 0.586* 0.749* 0.750*
(0.00893) (0.00639) (0.0141) (0.0102)
Price discrimination:
At Advt = 7c 1.575* 0.796* 6.046* 4.633*
[0.00109] [0.00725] [0.000235] [1.37e-05]
At Advt = 21 -0.449 0.362‡ 1.025 2.798*
[0.272] [0.0623] [0.503] [8.61e-05]
At Advt = 35 -0.0715 0.963
[0.689] [0.158]
Specification tests:
Serial correlationd 0.0115 0.0351 -0.864 -1.245
[0.991] [0.972] [0.388] [0.213]
Sargane 257.3 353.6 34.18 37.07
[1] [1] [1] [1]
Notes: The dependent variable is LnFareijt×1000. Figures in parentheses are the Windmeijer finite-
sample corrected standard errors of the GMM two-step estimates. Figures in brackets are p-values
with the null that the corresponding coefficient is equal to zero. ‡ significant at 10%; † significant at
5%; ∗ significant at 1%. a Omitted category is Morning. b Omitted category is Morning·Adv with
Adv controlled with day dummies. cβOffice − βEvening + βOffice·Adv ·Advt − βEvening·Adv ·Advt. d
The null hypothesis is that the errors in the first-difference regression exhibit no second-order serial
correlation (valid specification). e The null hypothesis is that the instruments are not correlated
with the residuals (valid specification).
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Table 6: Dynamic Price Discrimination. Market Structure.
Sample: 0 ≤ Adv < 29.6 29.6 ≤ Adv < 59.3 0 ≤ Adv < 59.3
(1) (2) (3)
Variables:
Officeta -2.314 -0.600 -1.620
(1.961) (0.679) (0.991)
Eveningt -1.425 -0.0852 -1.084
(1.926) (0.665) (0.973)
Officet ·HHIijb -1.252 -0.491 -0.634
(2.460) (0.844) (1.238)
Eveningt ·HHIij -3.341 -1.177 -1.782
(2.419) (0.829) (1.216)
LnFareij,t−1 0.647* 0.418* 0.625*
(0.00822) (0.0125) (0.00602)
Price discrimination:
At HHIij = 0.52
c 0.197 -0.158 0.0610
[0.787] [0.540] [0.870]
At HHIij = 0.78 0.740† 0.0198 0.359†
[0.0261] [0.866] [0.0344]
At HHIij = 1.00 1.200‡ 0.171 0.612†
[0.0543] [0.420] [0.0497]
Specification tests:
Serial correlationd -0.0338 0.0794 -0.0652
[0.973] [0.937] [0.948]
Sargane 339.5 285.9 394.9
[1] [1] [1]
Notes: The dependent variable is LnFareijt × 1000. Figures in parentheses are the
Windmeijer finite-sample corrected standard errors of the GMM two-step estimates.
Figures in brackets are p-values with the null that the corresponding coefficient is
equal to zero. ‡ significant at 10%; † significant at 5%; ∗ significant at 1%. a Omitted
category is Morning. b Omitted category is Morning·HHI with HHI controlled with
flight fixed effects. cβOffice − βEvening + βOffice·HHI ·HHIj − βEvening·HHI ·HHIj . d
The null hypothesis is that the errors in the first-difference regression exhibit no
second-order serial correlation (valid specification). e The null hypothesis is that
the instruments are not correlated with the residuals (valid specification).
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